Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, intentional object, sense, evidence, mental phenomenon, ontology.


An early stage in the development of phenomenology, as a matter of fact, is considered, which completes a long, foldable and richly planned process, within the framework of which a new philosophical methodology was formed. Among the concepts of phenomenology, the concept of intentionality is especially distinguished, as it is not only the basic characteristic of all mental acts of a person, but also a rethinking prompting ontology of wisdom. The basic provisions of the phenomenological theory of information are not in themselves an intentional principle, which changes the traditional for that hour the understanding of information as a mental interpretation of speeches. F. Brentano's position forces us to talk about certain ontological levels that are associated with a greater or lesser obviousness of real or mental objects. The general thesis proposed here is that phenomenology is not the creation of a single, even brilliant, thinker, but is a doctrine that completes a rather long, complex and multifaceted process within which a new philosophical position was formed. In this sense, it can be argued that the emergence of the phenomenological method was prepared by the entire development of European philosophy, in each stage of which one can find points of formation of the phenomenological method or points of thematic intersection with phenomenology. In this respect, phenomenology is not just a philosophical «invention», another» «system», but a doctrine that emerged at the intersection of rational and empirical theories of New European philosophy, starting in the nineteenth century. At an early stage of phenomenology's development, an important conceptual basis for building a scientific psychology that wants to consider mental phenomena in any meaningful way is revealed. This basis is contained in the concept of intentionality, which is fundamental to the construction and development of phenomenological discourse. However, it would be a mistake to treat intentional objects as products of the imagination or simple empirical data that psychology usually deals with. In a certain sense, an intentional object is not a psychological phenomenon, but one of the constituent elements of the original ontology, a material, a brick, which consistently makes up any ontological structure. Thus, already at the stage of the formation of the phenomenological doctrine, the contours and priorities of a new philosophy were determined, which positioned itself as a philosophy of consciousness and should be read as a prerequisite for the construction of a fundamental ontology.


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How to Cite
GRITSENKO, A. (2024). CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND FOR THE FORMATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE 19th CENTURY. Dnipro Academy of Continuing Education Herald. Series: Philosophy, Pedagogy, 2(2), 24-27.
Dnipro Academy of Continuing Education Herald. Series: Philosophy, Pedagogy